

Introduction

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Is modern philosophy racist? Does it matter that Locke defended slavery and helped run companies involved in the slave trade? That Berkeley owned slaves? That Hume thought blacks inferior to whites? That Kant agreed with Hume, and developed elaborate theories on the various races of humans? Are these facts merely incidental, calling for no thorough reexamination of the views of these figures? Or do the facts reveal something deeper about their philosophies, and about modern philosophy itself?

Scholars have been puzzling over these questions for some time now, and no consensus has been reached. For some, modern philosophy, or at least some of the major schools of thought within it—rationalism, empiricism, liberalism, social contract theory—is deeply racist. On this view, the appearance of race neutrality in these theories is belied by a deeper reading, and this calls for a major revision of our understanding of modern philosophy. For others, the racism expressed by some major modern philosophers has no significant implications for, say, their epistemology or their ethics. Rather, on this latter position, any racism expressed by modern philosophers can simply be detached from their philosophical views, and no reinterpretation of these views is required.

It should come as no surprise that some modern philosophers have something to answer for when it comes to race, since the period of modern philosophy—roughly the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries—was also the time during which ideas about race became fully developed in the West. Most scholars agree that race and racism (as opposed to xenophobia or ethnocentrism) are distinctly modern ideas, and it is no accident that these ideas developed at the time of

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the “discovery” of the “New World,” the development of colonialism, the African slave trade, and the racialized institution of slavery. Many explanations have been advanced for why racial ideas developed when and where they did: when Europeans were encountering seemingly very different peoples, race provided a way to understand and explain these differences;¹ this period was also when modern science was developing, which encouraged the construction of rigid categories to understand empirical phenomena;² racial categories, starting out as scientific tools, became an all too convenient rationalization for the exploitation of non-Europeans and their lands and resources;³ and, perhaps ironically, the universalist thrust of modern moral and political philosophy required a way to exclude Others who would otherwise be entitled to equal concern and respect.⁴ Whatever the explanation—and no doubt all of these factors played a role—the fact is that modern ideas about race and modern philosophical doctrines developed together in a context shaped by conquest, colonialism, and slavery.

This volume charts the relation between modern philosophy and race by closely examining their connections in the thought of thirteen major modern philosophers. Each chapter is an original essay that focuses on the role of race and racially implicated ideas in a modern philosopher’s thought. As such, the volume takes stock of, and contributes to, current debates on race and modern philosophy. It does so at a level that, it is hoped, is accessible to newcomers to these debates while being of interest to those familiar with them.



One way to begin an exploration of the intersection of race and modern philosophy is by looking at the relation between racist ideas on the one hand and empiricism and rationalism on the other, to see which philosophical approach is more compatible with racist doctrines. Harry Bracken,⁵ Richard Popkin,⁶ and Noam Chomsky⁷ have argued that rationalism is inhospitable to racism, but that empiricism lends itself to racist doctrines. Bracken argues that Locke’s anti-essentialism has the implication that there is no essence that unites all human beings, making it possible to treat skin color or any other feature as a defining characteristic—a view that lends itself to racist doctrines. A Cartesian epistemology, on the other hand, makes it difficult or impossible to advance racist doctrines, according to Bracken. At the very least Cartesianism provides “a modest conceptual brake to the articulation of racial degradation and slavery.”⁸ Focusing on Hume rather than Locke, Popkin argues that “his view about non-whites cannot be dismissed as a fleeting observation. It is intimately related to his thought, and to one of the problems of eighteenth-century thought—the justification of European superiority over the rest of mankind.”⁹ Noam Chomsky has concurred

in this general view of empiricism as supporting racism. Chomsky has suggested that “the [empiricist] concept of the ‘empty organism,’ plastic and unstructured, apart from being false, also serves naturally as the support for the most reactionary social doctrines.”¹⁰ Empiricism is a dangerous doctrine, according to Chomsky, because in denying the existence of innate mental structures or a substantial human nature, it undermines an important ground for claims of human freedom and dignity.

Others, however, have disputed these claims—among them John Searle and Kay Squadrito. Searle finds this line of reasoning “quite unacceptable.” First, he questions whether any of the major modern philosophers can be connected to racism, asserting that “[n]either the great rationalists—Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza—nor the great empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, [and] Hume [—] were engaged in facilitating a racist ideology.”¹¹ Searle’s second point is that if there were such a connection, empiricism lends itself to racist doctrines less easily than rationalism. “If anything, it is a shorter step from the Cartesian theory of the mind to the theory of racial inferiority than from the Humean, because once you believe that there are innate human mental structures, it is only a short step to argue that the innate mental structures differ from one race to another.”¹² Squadrito offers a more developed argument against the Bracken/Popkin/Chomsky position.¹³ Squadrito argues that historically it is empiricism that has been the more progressive force. Doctrines of innateness, she points out, have often been used to enshrine a particular conception of human nature and to place those who do not conform to this conception outside the realm of normalcy, and perhaps even humanity. “By stressing the point that there are no innate or inherent intellectual or moral differences between races . . . empiricists have provided a methodology which leads to toleration.”¹⁴ The arguments of Bracken, Popkin, and Chomsky notwithstanding, “[t]he Cartesian theory of the human mind provides no logical barrier to formulating a theory of racial or sexual inferiority.”¹⁵

At the level of generality at which this debate developed, it is difficult to say which “side” has the better arguments. On the one hand (and as the essays in this volume bear out), it would seem that the three main philosophers usually classed as “empiricists” have much more to answer for with regard to race than the three “rationalists.” Locke participated in the slave trade in various ways, Berkeley owned slaves, and Hume produced one of the first clear statements of a racist (or racistist) doctrine. By contrast, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz seem not to have stated clearly racist or racist sentiments, nor to have engaged in activities that were associated with such sentiments. However, if we focus on philosophical doctrines, matters become more ambiguous. It is true that the moral universalism of rationalism appears inhospitable to racism. But in the first place, the

The problem of conceptual clarity is perhaps more difficult because, even if anachronism is avoided, the fact remains that at any given point in time, there is surprisingly little consensus about the meaning of such words as *race* and *racism*. In the public arena today, these words are perhaps used more often as rhetorical weapons than as tools for clarifying issues or arguments. Yet even among philosophers, whose job it is to do the latter, there is no universal agreement. Part of the problem is that since ordinary language does not provide precise definitions, any philosophical definition of these key concepts must be, to at least some extent, stipulative. Still, one virtue of even a stipulative definition is that it captures some of the features of how the word is ordinarily used. Which features to pick out is open to debate, and different philosophers, who agree on the need for greater conceptual clarity than ordinary language provides, disagree on how this is best achieved.

One well-known attempt to achieve clarity on these matters is the effort by Anthony Appiah to distinguish between racism and racialism and then to distinguish between two kinds of racism.²¹ Racialism, on Appiah's understanding, is the "belief that there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race." As such, racialism is the belief in a "racial essence." While this view is mistaken, according to Appiah, it presents "a cognitive rather than a moral problem" because the issue is not a normative one—how people are to be treated—but "how the world is."²²

Moral issues come to the fore, however, with racist doctrines, because these do involve how people are appropriately treated. Racist doctrines generally endorse different treatment of people identified with different races, but Appiah distinguishes between two kinds of reasons for this treatment. For the extrinsic racist, "the racial essence entails certain morally relevant qualities"; that is, the extrinsic racist believes that people in different racial categories exhibit different characteristics, and these justify differential treatment. Extrinsic racism, then, rests on empirical claims whose successful rebuttal should undermine the extrinsic racist's racism. The intrinsic racist, on the other hand, does not rest her racism on empirical claims. She believes that "each race has a different moral status," and "no amount of evidence" will suffice to undermine her views.²³ She simply prefers members of some race(s) (usually her own) over others, but does not base this preference on morally relevant or empirically observable characteristics. In this way, Appiah says, the intrinsic racist is like someone who prefers her own family members simply because they are her family members.

I agree with Appiah that we must distinguish between racism and racialism, and between the moral and the empirical claims associated with each. However, there seem to be difficulties with Appiah's approach. Since both racialism and extrinsic racism involve empirical claims, the distinction between them rests on whether those claims involve "morally relevant qualities," that is, whether racial differences justify different treatment. Appiah mentions honesty, courage, and intelligence as examples of morally relevant qualities, but it is not clear how or in what ways these are morally relevant. For example, in what ways is it just to treat some people differently because of their inferior or superior intelligence? It would seem preferable if our conceptual distinction between racism and racialism did not rest on a substantive moral view about which qualities are morally relevant.

Another way of putting this point is that if the extrinsic racist is right that the characteristics on which she focuses are morally relevant, and right about the way they are relevant, then her basic moral position might not be objectionable. She could be wrong in associating these characteristics with certain races, but this is the same kind of error that the racialist makes—a cognitive, not a moral, one. So the extrinsic racist combines two positions: associating certain morally relevant characteristics with certain races (an empirical proposition) and advocating different treatment based on these characteristics (a normative proposition). If the latter proposition is not in itself objectionable (since the characteristics are *ex hypothesi* morally relevant), it is difficult to see what is morally, rather than empirically, wrong with the extrinsic racist's position—except insofar as it is objectionable to misapply a basically sound moral principle.

This suggests that the crucial distinction to be made here is between two propositions. The first is that there are races that differ in certain characteristics, an empirical position shared by racialists and extrinsic racists. The second is that members of different races are justly treated differently, a moral position shared by the extrinsic racist and the intrinsic racist. The key feature of racism that distinguishes it from racialism is its endorsement of different—usually worse—treatment of people according to race.

This way of distinguishing racism from racialism is suggested by the approach to these matters that Jorge Garcia takes.²⁴ Garcia states that "what we have in mind when we talk of racism is no longer simply a matter of beliefs." Rather, racism is best thought of as "rooted in the heart." Garcia's proposal "is that we conceive of racism as fundamentally a vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people . . . on account of their assigned race. . . . Racism, then, is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their ra-

tionality or irrationality, but our wants, intentions, likes and dislikes.” This way of thinking of racism accounts for why racism is always wrong. As “a form of disregard” or “ill-will,” it is wrong for the same reason that any kind of disregard or ill will is wrong.²⁵

Garcia’s approach also captures the distinction between moral claims and empirical claims about race. If racism is essentially ill will or disregard, then it is distinct from (though, of course, often related to) empirical beliefs about whether races exist and, if so, what characteristics they have. Hence Garcia’s account is compatible with Appiah’s suggestion that racialism, as distinct from racism, involves empirical claims about the world, and that if these claims are wrong, this is “a cognitive rather than a moral problem.”

Of course, the relation between our empirical and our normative beliefs is not as simple as this account would seem to suggest. If one probes the attitudes of someone who believes in the inferiority of some races on some characteristic, one is very likely to conclude that this person is not merely a racist but also a racist. In fact, if someone insists on maintaining racist beliefs in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, this in itself is evidence of racism. According to Garcia, “merely voicing an opinion that members of R₁ [a certain race] are inferior (in some germane way) will count as racist (in any of the term’s chief senses, at least) only if, for example, it expresses an opinion held from the operation of some predisposition to believe bad things about R₁s [members of that race], which predisposition itself stems in part from racial disregard.”²⁶ Yet despite the common connection between racism and racialism, it is worth preserving the distinction between them. This allows scientists, for example, to argue about empirical matters without worrying about being called racists, and it also allows us to correct mistaken racist beliefs without moral condemnation. In the case of genuine racism, moral condemnation is appropriate, but in some cases the problem may be simply mistaken beliefs about the world.

There are many questions left unanswered by this brief account. For example, some might object to the individualist nature of this view, as it sees racism as fundamentally about individuals’ beliefs and feelings. However, Garcia argues that his account can accommodate and explicate nonindividualist forms of racism such as institutional racism.²⁷ More difficult, perhaps, is the notion of “cultural racism,” which, some have argued, has come to replace traditional forms of racism. Cultural racism, as the name suggests, focuses on culture rather than biological race, but it is often associated with the same attitudes that came with “old” racism. Whether cultural racism is a form of racism or a form of ethnocentrism is a complex issue that I cannot settle here. The important point that

emerges from this discussion, however, is that the distinctions I have sketched, or something like them, are essential for thinking clearly about matters of race.

The volume opens with Timothy Reiss’s treatment of Descartes’s silences on slavery and race. Descartes had little to say on either subject, and his silences appear odd once Reiss places Descartes in his context. Descartes lived much of his adult life in Holland, which was a major slave trader at the time, and Descartes’s “teachers’ teachers” included thinkers who had debated the propriety of conquest and slavery extensively. So Descartes must have been aware of the growing slave trade and the philosophical debates to which it gave rise, and yet he remained silent, except for using the figure of a slave in his *Meditations*. His references to slaves in this work are vehicles for Descartes to discuss issues of free will, but they leave no doubt as to the humanity of the slave. Reiss concludes that there are no grounds for thinking Descartes supported slavery but that his silence on the issue remains troubling.

Barbara Hall then takes up the case of Hobbes. Hall points out that human equality is the fundamental assumption of Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, yet she also reminds us that “the savage people in . . . America” is Hobbes’s example of this state. While this may not necessarily reflect a racial view, Hall argues, it certainly shows that Hobbes thought Native Americans to be less developed than Europeans. Hobbes’s views on conquest are also disturbing, according to Hall, because Hobbes believed that Europeans had a “perfect right” to capture “insufficiently populated” lands. Hobbes also discussed slavery and argued that a slave has a right to kill his master but that in exchange for ending this state of enmity the slave might consent to being a servant. Hall concludes that Hobbes would have nothing to say against the African slave trade and would have endorsed the conquest of the “New World,” and that therefore, despite the lack of direct evidence for racism in Hobbes, his philosophical positions on these issues warrant considering him as a racist.

The two chapters that follow argue that the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz are incompatible with racism. For Spinoza, Debra Nails reminds us, every existing thing is a mode of existence, a manifestation of a single substance. Things are individuated by their tendency to cohere in a certain way, but in this sense, a race cannot simply be defined into existence—a brake against racial oppression, according to Nails. Indeed, from the perspective of Spinoza’s metaphysics, it is unclear in what sense races can be said to exist at all, except as a matter of “rational voluntary association.” When discussing the case of Jews, Spinoza—him-

self a Jew who was expelled from the Amsterdam Jewish community for his unorthodox views—denies any transcendent status to this group of individuals. Hence for Spinoza, the very idea of a race is without foundation, undercutting any rational basis for racism or racialism.

Though Leibniz is often cited as one of the first to use the word *race* in its modern sense, Peter Fennes argues that it is a mistake to view him as an advocate of the idea. Rather, Leibniz mentions race in passing, but does not endorse the idea or even dwell upon it. Early in his career, however, Leibniz did say that non-Christians were not humans but beasts and recommended aggressive war upon them. Furthermore, Leibniz conceived a bizarre plan to kidnap young, non-European boys and train them into a fierce army for such a war. Still, Leibniz's mature philosophy makes the idea of race highly problematic. If in reality there are only monads, then any classification of individuals must be justified. Nowhere does Leibniz endorse racial classification, and Fennes argues that there is reason to think he would not endorse it. The mature Leibniz denies that non-whites (or specifically "Australians") are not humans and says that they are able to be converted to Christianity, which is open to all rational animals. Hence Leibniz's metaphysics and his theology mitigate against racialism.

It was mentioned above that the three empiricists have much to answer for with regard to race, and the following three chapters bear this out. Robert Bernasconi and Anika Maaza Mann detail Locke's involvement in the African slave trade and in the writing of *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*, which sanctioned slavery. Can Locke's complicity with racialized slavery be reconciled with his political theory? Some commentators have answered no, but Bernasconi and Mann argue that we must interpret the political theory as being consistent with Locke's actions. Though on a literal reading Locke's just war theory of slavery would not sanction the hereditary institution of slavery, the authors argue that this does not show that this was not its intended purpose, or its effect. In fact, some did use Locke's theory to justify slavery. We cannot know for certain how Locke saw the relation between his just war theory of slavery and his support for racialized chattel slavery, but in any case the latter is strong evidence of Locke's racism.

Berkeley participated in slavery too—by owning slaves. William Uzgalis details Berkeley's efforts to found a college in Bermuda that would educate indigenous people and convert them to Christianity, and it was while he lived in Rhode Island waiting for funding for his college that Berkeley owned slaves. Berkeley was motivated by missionary zeal, and, Uzgalis argues, he is clearly guilty of ethnocentrism—presupposing the superiority of his own culture and religion. However, Berkeley is not guilty of racism, because he did not believe in the inherent or

irremediable inferiority of non-Europeans. Another reason that Berkeley had no quarrel with slavery is his rather conservative political views. He embraced the doctrine of passive obedience, which supports submission to existing authority and institutions. In the end it is not racism but Berkeley's religious and political views that explain Berkeley's approval of slavery.

Hume had no direct dealings with slavery, but he was among the first to explicitly state a racist, or at least racialist, doctrine. In my chapter on Hume, I focus on this statement, which appears in a footnote to his essay "Of National Characters." My main argument is that though the footnote itself is quite troubling, it does not have some of the implications that some scholars have drawn from it. It does not show, for example, that Hume was committed to a polygenetic theory of human origins, or that he supported slavery—in fact, he explicitly states his disapproval of slavery elsewhere. More important, the footnote does not show that Hume's whole philosophy is somehow racially coded, and attempts to demonstrate that it is have failed. Still, the footnote remains, showing that Hume himself believed in the inferiority of nonwhites, or at least of blacks. Here the contrast with Berkeley is instructive with regard to the contingent relation between views on slavery and on race: Berkeley was a nonracist who endorsed slavery, and Hume was a racialist who did not.

Unlike Berkeley and Hume, Rousseau embraced neither slavery nor racialism, according to Bernard Boxill's chapter. Boxill's argument focuses on *The Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, whose talk of "natural man" has led some to suspect Rousseau of racist sentiments. Boxill argues that the *Discourse* has neither racist presuppositions nor racist implications. While it is true that Rousseau believed some non-Europeans to be at an earlier stage of cultural development than Europeans, he explained this difference by reference not to innate racial differences but rather to differences in environment. (It could also be added that for Rousseau the kind of cultural development that European society had achieved was a mixed blessing at best.) In addition, and in contrast to Kant, Rousseau held a nonteleological vision of history, so while, according to Boxill, Kant's views potentially justify "the Europeanization of the world," Rousseau's do not.

As foreshadowed in Boxill's discussion, Kant's views may have some troubling implications in matters of race, and this worry is only confirmed by Charles Mills's chapter. Mills begins by differing with the general approach often taken to modern philosophers who both defend universalist ethics and express racist sentiments. Rather than seeing the latter as contradicting the former, we should see the racist sentiments as qualifying the universalism. In Kant's case, Mills argues, this means that Kant's views on the inferiority of nonwhites show that he intends his universal moral theory to apply only to white Europeans—that only these

count as “persons” for Kant. Mills argues that any attempt to detach Kant’s racial views from his philosophy, or to view them as peripheral, simply presupposes an answer to the very question at issue. Mills suggests that a nonracist “Kantianism” may be possible, but this should not be mistaken for Kant’s own philosophy.

Like Kant, Hegel expressed some clearly racist views, and his whole philosophy is infamously Eurocentric. In his chapter, Michael Hoffheimer focuses on Hegel’s philosophy of religion to show the importance of race in Hegel’s overall social and political philosophy. Hoffheimer demonstrates that early on Hegel absorbed the racial and cultural prejudices of his day, particularly the anti-Turk and anti-Islamic views. Hegel also absorbed the racial classifications of Kant and Blumenbach, and in his later work he increasingly relied upon race to categorize various religions. Through all of the changes in the particular features of his views, a constant theme in Hegel’s work on religion is the superiority of Christian Europe over non-European peoples; only the former are capable of freedom and of being governed by law. Hence, race—and the religious and cultural differences associated with it—is central to Hegel’s moral and political philosophy.

Although John Stuart Mill is often seen as a progressive thinker on issues of difference—particularly gender equity questions—Anthony Bogues argues in his chapter that Mill was not as enlightened on race as some have thought. Bogues places Mill in the context of Victorian political thought, which exhibits a consensus on the importance of character and “civilization.” Mill participated in this consensus, which led him to view many non-European societies as less developed than European ones. So while Mill was the “good guy” in his debate with Carlyle—rejecting the latter’s contentions that blacks are naturally inferior and that slavery is justified—Bogues argues that Mill remained within the mindset that saw European civilization as superior. As a result, Bogues interprets the Mill-Carlyle debate as being between two participants who agree more than they disagree with each other. The disagreement is over the form that European colonial rule should take, not over its fundamental propriety. These limitations in Mill’s thought are reflected in his provisos in *On Liberty* and in *Considerations on Representative Government* that liberty and self-government are not appropriate for “backward” societies.

Marx agreed with Mill that European civilization is superior, and with Hegel that history itself, in a strict sense, takes place mainly in European society. Despite this—and despite some racist remarks in his private letters—Richard Peterson argues that Marx should not be seen as a racist thinker. Rather, the most notable feature of Marx’s views on race is the extent to which Marx left race untheorized. Though Marx (and later Marxists) saw race as a barrier to working-class solidarity, he did not examine it as an independent source of oppression. In

addition, Marx’s relation to anti-Semitism is complex. Marx himself came from a Jewish family (his father converted so that he could practice law), and Marx was the object of anti-Semitic attacks. Yet at the same time Marx sometimes seems to be anti-Semitic, because, Peterson explains, he adopted the conventional association of Judaism with commercial activity. In any case, Peterson argues, the fundamental problem with Marx’s relation to race is not that Marx was racist but that he failed to account for the complex relations between race and class and for the importance of racial identity.

In the final chapter, James Winchester examines Nietzsche’s views on race. Against those who have charged that Nietzsche was a racist, Winchester shows that his relation to race is far too complex to be captured by this label. Although Nietzsche made some disturbing remarks on this score, he also departed from conventional racial thinking of his day by claiming, for example, that Jews constituted a strong race and Germans a mixed and weak one. These views, among others, do show that Nietzsche was a racialist—he believed that races were real and had great causal significance in shaping thought and culture. This view, combined with his assessment of the German and Jewish races, led Nietzsche to recommend “mixing” of the two in order to strengthen the German race. While Nietzsche sometimes thought in racial terms, his use of racial ideas was neither consistent nor well worked out.

I do not attempt to draw any overall conclusion from the chapters of the volume. There are far too many issues in play here, far too much complexity to allow for that, and my brief summaries do not begin to capture the subtlety of the arguments. Furthermore, there are many issues—of both interpretation and substance—on which the contributors to the volume disagree. It would therefore be a mistake to attempt to bring the discussion to a neat conclusion. It also would be a mistake to pretend that any of the arguments contained here is the last word. Rather, the goal of the volume is to assess the state of the discourse on race and modern philosophy and to contribute to this important set of discussions. If the chapters that follow do this—both individually and collectively—we will consider it a success.

NOTES

1. John Immerwahr and Michael Burke, “Race and the Modern Philosophy Course,” *Teaching Philosophy* 16 (1993): 21–34.
2. Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
3. Bernard Boxill, *Introduction to Race and Racism*, ed. Bernard Boxill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–42.

4. George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
5. See Harry M. Bracken, "Essence, Accident, and Race," *Hermathena* 116 (1973): 81-96; Bracken, "Philosophy and Racism," *Philosophia* 7 (1978): 241-60.
6. Richard H. Popkin, "The Philosophical Basis of Eighteenth-Century Racism," *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 3 (1973): 245-62; Popkin, "The Philosophical Basis of Modern Racism," in *The High Road to Pyrrhonism* (San Diego: Austin Hill, 1980), 79-102; Popkin, "Hume's Racism," in *High Road*, 251-66; Popkin, "Hume's Racism Reconsidered," in *The Third Force in Seventeenth Century Thought* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 64-75.
7. Noam Chomsky, *Reflections on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 123-34.
8. Bracken, "Essence," 93.
9. Popkin, "Philosophical Basis of Eighteenth-Century Racism," 246.
10. Chomsky, *Reflections*, 132.
11. John Searle, "The Rules of the Language Game" [review of Chomsky's *Reflections on Language*], *Times Literary Supplement*, September 10, 1976, 1120.
12. Searle, "Rules," 1120.
13. Kay Squadrito, "Racism and Empiricism," *Behaviorism* 7 (1979): 105-15.
14. *Ibid.*, 110.
15. *Ibid.*, 112.
16. Fredrickson, *Racism*, 64-70.
17. David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 10, 28. Goldberg continues this line of thought in *The Racial State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
18. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Race and the Enlightenment* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of the Postracial Future* (New York: Routledge, 2001), chaps. 2, 3.
19. Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64-72.
20. There are too many works on philosophy and race to cite them all here, but some notable examples not yet cited include Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott, eds., *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, eds., *The Idea of Race* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Robert Bernasconi, ed., *Race* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Robert Bernasconi with Sybol Cook, eds., *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Lucius T. Outlaw Jr., *On Race and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Leonard Harris, ed., *Racism* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999); H. F. Augstein, ed., *Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996); Susan E. Babbitt and Sue Campbell, eds., *Racism and Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But . . .": *The Moral Quandary of Race* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, eds., *Racism in Mind* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
21. Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Racisms," in *Anatomy of Racism*, ed. David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 3-17.
22. *Ibid.*, 4-5.
23. *Ibid.*, 5-6.

24. Jorge L. A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism," in *Racism*, ed. Harris, 398-434.
25. *Ibid.*, 399-401.
26. *Ibid.*, 408.
27. *Ibid.*, 404.